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Doctrines and Problems Relating to
U.S. Control of Transnational
Corporate Concentration
DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, STUART E.
BENSON, & LISA CHILES

The Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has recently published a report on corporate concentration among
OECD member states.' The OECD report, which was four years in preparation, has drawn on data supplied by nine member states. Among its conclusions are the following:
1.

2.

3.

4.

Substantially more increases than decreases in concentration occurred
in Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and in the industries analyzed by the EEC;
In the United States, over the period 1958 to 1972, concentration tended
to remain stable in already highly concentrated industries but increased
in the low to medium concentrated industries in a sample of 183 comparable manufacturing industries... ;
The relationship between industry concentration and growth confirmed
the theoretical prediction that at high rates of growth, concentration
decreased, but that at low to medium growth rates, concentration tended
to increase;
In general, the evidence of most studies is that high [arguably monopoly]
profits are associated with concentrated industries;
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5.

Imports did not restrain the ability of larger firms to raise their margins
relative to the smaller firms unless there was a very high degree of
import penetration; 2 and
One United States study found that a two firm concentration ratio of
35 percent or more correlated significantly with high price/cost margins. Structure itself "as measured by different concentration ratios
explain more 3than about one-fifth of the variance in industry price/
cost margins."

6.

Given this evidence it is not surprising that "high or rapidly growing
levels of concentration are increasingly becoming a matter of concern in
many countries, 4 including the United States. However, a subject of intense
controversy within the United States has been with what should U.S. antitrust authorities be concerned, how concerned should they be, and how
reliable are the data on which concerns are based. The greatest controversy
surrounds the question of whether aggregate industrial concentration in
modem societies is increasing rapidly and dangerously. According to David
G. Gill of Exxon Corporation, a member of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD which monitors official OECD activities, no
inference should be drawn from
the OECD report that aggregate concentra5
tion is becoming a problem.
While it is generally conceded that the problem of aggregate concentration is controversial among antitrust experts,6 as well as the general public, it
is perhaps less well appreciated whether (and to what extent) there is a
problem in the United States of intraindustry concentration (concentration
among the manufacturers of the same goods) and if it is itself controversial.
The conclusions of the OECD report are at variance with those of other
analysts.7
It is the principal thesis of this article that important recent case decisions in U.S. antitrust law reflect just this conflict over the extent to which
intraindustry (horizontal) concentration is economically harmful. We are at a
point where the future direction of the law is difficult to discern. Until there
is greater U.S. policy agreement, and consistency within U.S. law itself, it is
unlikely that any common transnational response will emerge to even horizontal corporate concentration. Ironically, it may not be possible to clarify
U.S. antitrust law as long as the underlying policy conflict remains so sharp.
For the present, there is an impasse in the United States regarding the
question of corporate concentration.
The initial section of this article focuses on some existing legal impasses
in the United States with respect to concentration (1) by mergers between
manufacturers of the same product, especially where the failing company's
defense and considerations of potential competition are involved, (2) by technology licensing between noncompeting firms manufacturing comparable
products, and (3) by traditional and shared monopolies.
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Four topics, deserving attention in a more comprehensive analysis, will
not be discussed. The first of these is conglomerate mergers. Conglomerate
mergers have generally been permitted under U.S. antitrust law. Since they
promote aggregate concentration, they are subject to criticism by those who
see aggregate concentration as a danger. As already indicated, there is
enough controversy over the problem
of horizontal concentration to leave this
8
even more divisive topic to others.
The second topic is vertical mergers. While conceptually distinct and the
subject of a large literature in its own right,9 a vertical merger may frequently
be analyzed in the same manner as a horizontal merger between a potential
competitor and an existing firm in an industry. In vertical merger cases,
customer or supplier enterprises are often the most likely actual or perceived
potential entrants into a particular product market.
The third excluded topic is transnational corporate concentration by private international cartel.' 0
The fourth topic is the role of governments in promoting corporate concentration through the implementation of anticompetitive laws and policies.
It is sufficient to point out that governments often undo with one hand what
they undertake with the other. As antitrust authorities from several nations
are considering how concentration might be lessened to promote competition, others in these same governments are devising programs to increase
concentration and stabilize markets, sometimes in the service of the same
ultimate objective of greater productivity and allocative efficiency.
Next, the article touches more briefly on a few of the special problems of
applying United States law to foreign firms operating within the United
States and to U.S. transnational enterprises operating in foreign countries.
United States antitrust enforcement policy seeks evenhanded application of
U.S. law to foreign as well as domestic enterprises." However, this is not
always possible because of special problems raised by (1) the so-called extraterritorial assertion of U.S. jurisdiction where doing so conflicts with important laws and policies of other nations, (2) the difficulties in obtaining relevant information from foreign jurisdictions, (3) the difficulties of obtaining
effective relief from excessive concentration outside one's sovereign territory,
and (4) the erosion of the "potential competition" doctrine in recent decisions
by the United States Supreme Court.' 2 These problems combine to give
foreign enterprises certain advantages over domestic enterprises in avoiding
U.S. antitrust regulation.
The Conclusion shows that given the current impasse in U.S. antitrust
enforcement against horizontal concentration, especially where it involves
conduct beyond our shores, there are no imminent prospects for defining
transnational enforcement standards or establishing transnational enforcement institutions. Nonetheless, some modest transnational collaboration is
possible and desirable to clarify policy choices and build a foundation for
future progress.
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THE CONCENTRATION PART OF THE PROBLEM OF
TRANSNATIONAL CONCENTRATION

The identification of a concentration problem is founded on the assumption
that if one or a few firms acquire the power to control prices as to distinct
products in a geographically-defined market, competition will be suppressed,
product quality will decline (as will the range of consumer choice and producer productivity, including the development of new technology), and
prices will reflect some degree of monopoly profits. On the other hand, other
considerations may tend to vitiate the characterization of industrial concentration as a problem. For example, large-scale markets and production experience may increase rather than decrease efficiency; industrial competition in
a high-growth phase may consolidate the industry into a few strong competitors with the weakest firms having to drop out; in the international setting,
domestic concentration may be necessary and therefore desirable in order to
maintain an internationally competitive position. There is as yet no strong
consensus on either the characterization of concentration as a problem, or on
what approaches to the problem so defined are most effective.
Nonetheless, U.S. antitrust law takes a certain cognizance of industrial
concentration as a problematic phenomenon. The prototypical illustration of
this phenomenon in the antitruster's demonology is that of the U.S. steel
industry over the course of this century. Antitrust authorities sometimes view
the relative concentration and lack of competition in the steel industry as a
primary cause of its present state of technological retardation and resultant
difficulty in competing with imported steel. 13
Statutory Overview
Three principal antitrust statutes are directly relevant to the effort to deal with
this problem of concentration, but Section 7 of the Clayton Act is probably the
most powerful tool in the antitrust regulatory regime.14 Section 1 of the Sherman Act 15 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 16 require
evidence of conspiracies in restraint of trade or unfair trade practices respectively, in order to obtain remedial prohibitions. Similarly, Section 2 of the
Sherman Act 17 requires a showing of affirmative action to obtain or restrain
market power by exclusionary or predatory conduct.' 8
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, however, only requires evidence that a
corporation engaged in commerce in the United States is seeking to acquire
another and, by so doing, may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly. Moreover, when applied prior to the consummation of an
acquisition, Section 7 permits quick, clean, and effective relief to avert anticompetitive effects by prohibiting the merger. One of the many vexing problems subsumed by the general issue of concentration is that of formulating an
appropriate remedial order for anticompetitive mergers that have already been9
consummated between firms of signficant size in a concentrated market.'
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Mergers Between Producersof the Same Product
Although Section 7 seems to be, in theory, the most effective of the present
antitrust statutes, its enforcement by the Justice Department appears to be
declining. According to an unpublished study by the Antitrust Division
there were twenty-three Section 7 prosecutions filed by the Department of
Justice in 1969, sixteen in 1973, and only eleven in 1979.20 The meaning of
this decline is unclear. At least as to horizontal mergers between actual
competitors, the decline may be a reflection of the only locus of consensus
on horizontal concentration doctrine-the general validity of the 1968
Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice (Merger Guidelines). 2 The
Merger Guidelines, twelve years ago, announced that they are to be read
"only as a statement of current Department policy, subject to change at any
time without prior notice"22 and, of course, are not binding on courts.
Nonetheless, not only the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), but also the courts and private antitrust practitioners have been
heavily influenced by the relative clarity and precision of the guidelines.
Illustrative of this precision is the instruction given in the guidelines for
analyzing a possible merger by one of the four largest firms making a product
as to which they share 75 percent of a geographic market. According to the
guidelines, if the acquiring firm possesses a 4 percent market share, the
Department of Justice will ordinarily challenge the acquisition of a competitor with another 4 percent market share.2 If the acquiring firm's share is 15
percent, then an acquisition of a firm with only a 1 percent market share is
likely to be challenged.24
Since September 5, 1978, when the premerger regulations went into
effect, companies with substantial sales into, or assets within, the United
States must give prior notice to federal antitrust enforcement agencies when
planning to merge.2 Of the approximately sixty proposed transnational
mergers referred to the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division,
during the first eighteen months of this new notification requirement, only
one involved firms with proportionate market shares close to the standards
set forth in the guidelines. In fact, only three raised any substantial antitrust
question at all and none of these appeared,
based on traditional enforcement
26
considerations, to warrant prosecution.
It appears that this consensus in merger law was formed largely because
of the conclusion by the private antitrust bar and its clients that the standards are reasonable and reduce uncertainty in business planning.
Professor William James Adams has identified two distinct modes of
analysis for reviewing mergers. He calls one "competition as a quasi-goal of
society." The other is "competition for the sake of efficiency." According to
the former, competition is always desirable. According to the latter, competition is only desirable when it yields net benefits. 2 This distinction strikes to
the heart of the current debate over horizontal concentration. If antitrust
lawyers, their clients, and judges conclude that some horizontal mergers
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involving a big firm in a concentrated market are economically beneficial
("competition for the sake of efficiency") the present consensus on the validity of the guidelines may dissolve. In fact, there already is evidence that the
consensus is eroding in two special horizontal merger situations.
Acquisition of the "Failing Company"
The first involves the acquisition of an allegedly failing company. Where the
firm to be acquired is likely to withdraw from the market by ceasing operations, it is no more anticompetitive, in many instances, to let another firm
buy it out than to let it go under. The Merger Guidelines state that the
department will accept the defense only where the firm to be acquired has
(1) "depleted resources," (2) only "remote prospects for rehabilitation," and
(3) made "good faith efforts... to elicit a reasonable offer of acquisition more
consistent with the purposes of Section 7.28
How badly off must the acquired firm be? How hard must it try to find a
more eligible suitor? In General Dynamics,29 the Supreme Court may have
suggested that it will entertain arguments about the lack of competitive harm
from a merger which violates the Merger Guidelines, especially where the
acquired firm is competitively weak, with depleted resources, even if not
failing. In that case the acquired company owned substantial coal reserves
that were committed under long-term requirements contracts. Because the
reserves of the acquired firm were spoken for, the Court concluded that the
acquisition was not anticompetitive.
In a recent decision, United States v. InternationalHarvester Co.,30 the
Seventh Circuit read General Dynamics to permit a merger of two companies
with more than 20 percent sales in the concentrated market for highpowered farm tractors. Apparently, the court felt that while the acquired
company, Steiger, was not failing, it was competitively weak for lack of adequate access to funds for investment. Since Harvester, the purchaser of 40
percent stock interest in Steiger, had a deep31 pocket, the court reasoned that
the acquisition would serve Steiger's needs.
Department of Justice officials have criticized this decision and its suggestion that the failing company defense is now reduced to a "weakened
competitor" defense.32 They correctly point out that the Supreme Court in
General Dynamics did not conclude that the contractual commitment of its
coal reserves made the acquired firm a weak competitor. It only concluded
that the committed reserves were not a factor in the market and that the
relevant product market was properly narrowed to reserve coal mining capacity for future sales.33 There is now a direct conflict between two circuit courts
and the issue remains for future resolution.
Acquisition by a Potential Competitor
The second horizontal situation in which there appears to be erosion of the
Merger Guidelines involves acquisitions by potential future (but not present)
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competitors. According to the guidelines, the threat of entry, either through
internal (de novo) expansion or toehold acquisition of a small firm already
present, "may often be the most significant competitive limitation on the exercise of market power by leading firms, as well as the most likely source of
additional actual competition. '34 In two important decisions, one domesticthe Marine Bancorporationcase, 3 5 the other international-the British Oxygen case, 36 some doubt has been cast on the vitality of that proposition.
In Marine Bancorporation,the Supreme Court established two tests for
a successful challenge to an acquisition of one firm by another based on the
acquirer being an actual potential entrant by de novo or toehold entry. First,
there must be proof that the entrant could feasibly enter the market by other
routes. Second, and more demanding, there must be proof that entry by
another route would have a "substantial likelihood of ultimately producing
37
deconcentration of that market or other significant procompetitive effects."
Implicitly, by setting this condition, the Supreme Court adopted what Adams
has called the "competition for the sake of efficiency" mode of concentration
analysis. However, the Department of Justice in the Merger Guidelines usually employs the "competition as a quasi goal of society" standard. 38 Competition is thought to be facilitated when unjustified concentration is frustrated.
It is not necessary, appropriate, or even perhaps possible to demonstrate that
the acquirer will clearly establish a significant independent presence in the
market if its acquisition plans are blocked. The Supreme Court's test puts the
law enforcer in the perverse position of having to know better than the
acquirer itself what its true prospects are for entry by means other than
acquisition. It would make more sense to put the burden of proof on the
acquirer to justify why independent entry is not feasible. Either way, this
decision makes a departure from the clear structural guidelines of excessive
horizontal concentration-a major purpose and benefit of the guidelines.
At present, the law of potential competition-especially as to transnational mergers-is at an impasse. In British Oxygen, the world's second
largest producer of industrial gases-with no prior sales in the United
States-acquired the third largest producer, Airco (a U.S. company), that
occupied 16 percent of a product market in which the top three firms held 60
percent of the market.39 In upholding the acquisition, the Second Circuit
found that the Federal Trade Commission did not show that British Oxygen
was a potential entrant in the reasonably near future. The court held that a
showing of "eventual" entry was not sufficient.4 ° While not discussed in the
opinion, it is worth noting that both the British government and the European Commission filed papers with the court supportive of the merger, arguing that foreign potential entrants are handicapped by cultural and social
barriers that make independent entry even more difficult for them than for
domestic potential entrants. 4 ' This decision would lead one to expect easy
access to American markets by major foreign firms acquiring large American
firms.
However, a recent decision by the Federal Trade Commission indicates
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that the issue has not been finally settled. In the Matter of Brunswick
42
Corporation,
involved a joint venture to manufacture less expensive outboard motors. One of the partners was Brunswick. Its Mercury Division had
approximately 20 percent of the market 3 which made it the second largest of
four domestic manufacturers jointly occupying 95 percent of the market. 4
The other partner was the Japanese firm Yamaha. Yamaha manufactured
and sold outboard motors everywhere in the world but the United Statesthe largest market.4 5 Yamaha was already established as a successful seller of
motorcycles and snowmobiles throughout the United States, but had failed
twice before to penetrate the outboard motor market de novo.16 The FTC
found (on relatively compressed analysis) that by 1973
Yamaha had the
47
technology to compete effectively in the United States.
Late in 1972, the two firms had formed a joint venture, Sanshin, to
make outboard motors in Japan. These were to be marketed in Japan under a
Yamaha label and in the United States under a Mariner label. The joint
venture was for a period of ten years with automatic three-year renewals
(unless revoked with three years' notice).4 8 The FTC decision found that the
three burdens of proof imposed by the decisions in Marine Bancorporation
and British Oxygen had been met. First, Yamaha's technical capability and
market experience demonstrated the feasibility of its entry. 49 De novo entry
was found to be possible through (1) its national network of motorcycle and
snowmobile dealers, (2) 50private label mass merchandisers, or (3) camping
and sports supply stores.
Second, the likelihood of significant procompetitive effects was found in
Yamaha's overall financial strength, development of an advanced motor, successful expansion history worldwide, and intention to compete effectively at
the time the joint venture was entered. 51
Finally, the FTC took the fact of the joint
venture itself as proof that
5 2
Yamaha was an imminent potential entrant.
There is a second potential competition theory besides that of actual
potential entry. It is the theory of the perceived potential entrant "waiting in
the wings" as a threat of competition, keeping present competitors from
giving in to the temptation of oligopoly or collusive pricing. 53 This theory for
control of concentration is even more tenuous, as it depends upon perceptions that are subjective and therefore likely to be ambiguous if enough
people are canvased. Nevertheless, the FTC explicitly held that Yamaha
alone among noncompeting enterprises was able "to inspire the fear of competition in the hearts of U.S. manufacturers" before it entered the joint
54
venture.
The case is now on remand to the Administrative Law Judge for a relief
determination, since the Commission had reversed the initial decision on
liability. The difficulty reconciling Brunswick with British Oxygen suggests
that the potential competition doctrine will stand or fall on the weight given
to particular facts of particular adjudications. By applying the three conservative tests of liability and finding it as to a nonpermanent joint venture (even
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where Yamaha had twice previously failed to effect de novo entry) the FTC
has boldly attempted to reestablish the vitality of the position taken in the
Merger Guidelines-that is, competition as a quasigoal of society.
Whether or not the potential competition doctrine is applied in U.S. law,
can have a profound impact upon the U.S. domestic economy as well as the
transnational economy. If foreign enterprises that are only potential competitors are virtually free to make horizontal domestic acquisitions, the trend
toward foreign takeovers in U.S. markets is stimulated at a time when U.S.
companies appear to be substantially undervalued. It also suggests the possibility that international concentration by merger may reach problem proportions before concentration reaches the trigger point in any national market.
Consider a hypothetical case of a Canadian acquirer not competing in the
U.S. market which acquires a U.S. target not selling in Canada. The Canadian firm is the fifth largest in Canada, and the U.S. firm is fifth largest in
America. There would be no increase in the five-firm concentration ratio in
either Canada or the United States, but there may be a significant increase in
concentration in the aggregate North American market.
Concentrationby Technology License
The preceding discussion of the Brunswick case demonstrates that many of
the effects of a merger, including anticompetitive concentration, can be
achieved by joint venture. 5 The same is true of technology licensing by one
firm to another, or reciprocally, where the effects of the arrangement may be
not only the reduction of competition inter se but the reduction of significant
consumer choice in the product market generally.
In this area of the law there is something of an impasse as to what types
of technology-sharing arrangements between large firms in concentrated
markets should be and are illegal. Three current and contradictory theories of
excessively anticompetitive concentration are discernible.
The first, and most dubious, is reflected in the most recent decision to
consider the issue. In United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,56 Judge
Weigel held that a fifty-year-old reciprocal know-how agreement between
two billion-dollar worldwide enterprises (Westinghouse and Mitsubishi), as
to virtually their full line of hundreds of electrical products, was not illegal
even though the two enterprises generally did not compete in each other's
home market and the agreement had so provided. His decision was based
on two considerations: (1) it is necessary to prove anticompetitive intent to
57
render such an agreement illegal, regardless of the anticompetitive effect,
and (2) no such intent is shown here because the most plausible explanation for the failure of Mitsubishi to sell in the United States in competition
with Westinghouse is fear of infringing on Westinghouse patents. 58
The first consideration, as the Department of Justice has argued on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit,59 flatly contradicts the Supreme Court decision
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, which held
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that the legality of agreements must be tested against their effect on competition. 60 Judge Weigel's second finding is undercut by the fact that the case
was decided immediately after the government presented its case, before the
defendants had intoduced specific evidence showing that there were Westinghouse patents actually blocking Mitsubishi sales. There is no precedent
for imposing on the plaintiff the burden of proving the negative-in this
case,
61
that patents must have blocked licensee entry into the U.S. market.
An alternative theory of liability is argued by the United States on
appeal.
A major manufacturer in a highly concentrated market may not repeatedly renew broad, multiproduct, multipatent license agreements that
have the effect of disabling major potential competitors from
providing
62
badly needed additional competition in the United States.
In its brief, the United States offers evidence demonstrating that Mitsubishi,
but for the long-term, multiproduct license, was an actual potential entrant
into the U.S. market. It argues that:
The court need not determine how long competitors may renew patent
license agreements before the antitrust laws are violated. There is no
single answer to that question. Rather, under a rule of reason analysis,
the answer in each case will depend on the economic factors relevant
to the parties and markets involved. The issue in this case is, however,
whether the restraints imposed for over fifty years can now be justified
63
as reasonable in light of the relevant present day economic realities.
The caution of this statement suggests that reciprocal licensing agreements between large finns in concentrated markets that may have a restrictive effect may still be legal if their duration is somewhat less than fifty years
or covering a somewhat smaller range of products than several hundred.
Recent experience of the senior author in Department of Justice decision
making in the technology licensing area demonstrates that this has been the
recent enforcement philosophy of the department. The department has not
filed a single suit following up on its theory in the Westinghouse case. Such a
view encourages long-term restrictive technology-sharing agreements between the largest transnational enterprises, even in oligopolistic industries.
While such licensing does promote some efficient dissemination of technology, one wonders whether the disincentives to independent research in concentrated industries, stemming from dependence on a licenser effectively
eliminated from the competitive market for perhaps two or three decades, do
not outweigh the benefits of collaboration.
The Department of Justice appeared to take a more aggressive position
in its Antitrust Guide for International Operations, now more than three
years old.64 The essential problem in this area of antitrust enforcement is
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determining whether a licensee could become a competitor of the licenser
65
without the benefit of the license. Recognizing this problem as others have,
the guide suggests that it may be relevant to ask whether the restraint on
competition exceeds "the time it would take [for the licensee] to develop
equivalent know-how itself (the reverse engineering period)." 6 Unfortunately, this "reverse engineering" test begs the question. There is no objective or precise measure of the reverse engineering capability of a licensee.
Perhaps the most effective approach for exercising greater control over excessive concentration by technology licensing would be to shift the burden of
proof to the licensing parties where the territorial restraint exceeds a period
of, say, fifteen years, and the parties are large, well-financed, technologically
sophisticated, and operating in noncompetitive industries with significant
67
barriers to entry.
Confusion as to which of these three antitrust enforcement approaches
to restrictive technology licensing (or yet another) will be used in the future
68
reflects the conflict between Adams's two modes of competition analysis.
Those who believe that seeking competition for itself increases the economic
efficiency of a society will probably favor a policy to limit restrictive technology licensing between large potentially competitive enterprises. On the other
hand, those who believe that many technological problems are too difficult
and too costly for efficient competitive solutions, will tend to favor a less
aggressive policy. Again, there is something of an impasse.
Traditionaland Shared Monopolies
The word control in describing existing concentration in the United States is
a misnomer. Dealing with concentration per se as a restraint of trade or a
monopoly is difficult under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. When monopolies do violate statutes, however, traditional U.S.
antitrust theory is not content with mere restraint of the monopoly power.
The earliest antitrust cases made it clear that the primary purpose of Sherman Act Section 2 is to break up, dissolve, or dissipate monopoly power. In
the 1911 Standard Oil case, the Supreme Court recognized that remedial
relief must not only prevent the conduct that created and maintained a
monopoly, but eliminate the monopoly and restore or recreate competition in
the affected market. 69 The National Commission for the Review of the Antitrust Laws and Procedures (Commission), recently supported this view.7"
In its January 1979 report the Commission urged the use of structural
relief in Section 7 and Section 2 cases. 71 The Commission's report relied on
two major factors to support this view. First, the commissioners agreed that
structural relief is more effective in restoring competition to an affected market. If the only relief is an injunction prohibiting certain conduct, the concentrated market will remain; subsequent abuses will be likely, since the
basic market conditions persist, and no court could possess the foresight to
enjoin all possible forms of abuse that a monopolist may contrive. Second,
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use of structural relief avoids the need for continuing judicial or administrative supervision of a monopolist to determine whether it is abusing its position or engaging
in various practices designed to enhance its position in the
72
market.
One question that was not addressed by the Commission is whether the
need to maintain international competitiveness should be a defense to an
order of dissolution. For example, under Japan's comparable antitrust statute,
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission may not order divestiture when it may
73
make it "difficult for the firm to maintain international competitiveness."
74
This issue has not yet been raised in a U.S. antitrust case.
The Commission emphasized that persistent monopoly power, except in
extraordinary circumstances, can be maintained only by culpable conduct.75
This accords with the view expressed in Alcoa 76 and United Shoe,7 7 among
others, that monopoly power itself creates a presumption of culpable conduct
which can only be rebutted by evidence of superior skill and foresight. As a
result, a number of the commissioners believed that the requirement that
conduct to enhance or maintain power should be eliminated by legislation, so
that evidence of persistent monopoly power would lead to dissolution unless
significant economies of scale were shown.7 8 Others believed it was important to retain the conduct element. 79 Nevertheless, the commissioners agreed
that persistent monopoly can only be maintained by culpable conduct."0
Some recent cases indicate that the trend is just the other way; that is,
U.S. courts may be more willing to tolerate monopolies and are raising the
burden of proof accordingly for those attacking such power. The courts appear most tolerant of monopoly power when design changes or product innovations are involved. California Computer Products (CalComp) recently sued
IBM for appropriating its market share in peripheral equipment that CalComp manufactures to fit into IBM's central processing units.8 IBM manufactures both the central units and the peripheral equipment itself. CalComp
was in the business through the process of reverse engineering, whereby it
would buy a product from IBM, break it down and copy it, and then undersell
IBM since IBM's research and design costs were avoided. IBM made design
changes that effectively prevented CalComp from competing on the peripheral units for new machines. Some of the design changes, such as integration of the add-on functions into the main unit, meant not only a lag time,
but that CalComp could not compete at all.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected CalComp's argument that
these technological manipulations violated the antitrust law. 2 CalComp
argued that the changes did not improve performance, but the court found
both cost savings to the consumer and improved performance in the new
83
units.
The recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision overturning most of
the district court's award in Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak,8 4 presents a
similar case. In 1972, Kodak introduced the 110 photographic system, including a camera and new film format to go with it. Those companies, in-
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cluding Berkey, that manufactured cameras using film provided by Kodak,
could not immediately compete with Kodak's new camera, and Berkey
claimed that Kodak had unlawfully monopolized the market. The 110 system
had been an immediate success, and Kodak's market share for amateur cameras did not fall below 50 percent for four years.
Berkey presented evidence that the new film product was actually inferior (at least initially) to existing products. The court avoided making any
determination of the value of the new product, deciding that this was a
matter of individual taste. The important question for the court was whether
some coercion was involved. 8 5 Was the desire to use the new format motivated by desire to impede competition? The court found no evidence that
Kodak attempted to persuade customers to purchase the 110 camera because
it was the only camera that could take the new film. 86 The court concluded
there was no coercive behavior and no violation of the antitrust laws.
In neither of these cases did the court seek to assess the value of the
new product. Both courts indicated that the antitrust laws are aimed at
unreasonable business behavior such as predatory pricing or coercive practices. In CalComp, the court concluded that price cuts by IBM were not
predatory since they were profitable to IBM and were responsive to competi87
tion from the peripherals manufacturers such as CalComp.
The Commission report also urged the courts to take a tougher stand in
"attempt to monopolize" cases, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
Commission was primarily concerned about the approach taken in United
States v. Empire Gas,88 where the conduct was particularly anticompetitive,
but was not actionable since the defendant's market share was not large
enough to present a "dangerous probability of success" of monopolization of
the market.8 9
The Commission concluded that a legislative change to clarify the "dangerous probability" requirement may be necessary,9" because the Supreme
Court has declined to reconcile various circuit court decisions that have
construed the "dangerous probability" requirement differently. 9 ' The Commission's proposed legislation would require courts, in determining the existence of a dangerous "risk" of monopoly, to weigh several factors including
the defendant's intent, its present or probable market power, and the anticompetitive potential of the conduct involved.92 Moreover, under the proposal, the evidence by defendants that prices were not below average variable
or marginal cost would not be an absolute defense, but just another factor to
be considered.93
Successful prosecution of an "attempt to monopolize" case is most difficult because of the burden of proving a "dangerous probability of success."
Inasmuch as courts evince greater tolerance of monopoly power, they may
also increase the existing burden of proof for attempt cases. These concerns
are evident in the FTC action against Dupont,94 in which it is alleged that
Dupont was employing illegal strategies to expand its production of titanium
dioxide to meet or capture all growth in the market. These strategies in-
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cluded pricing low enough to prevent other companies from expanding production and refusing to license its technology, which permitted DuPont to
preserve its technological advantage over competitors.9 5 The administrative
law judge agreed that DuPont would probably acquire a monopoly share, but
refused to hold any of DuPont's actions to be unfair or unreasonable. The
opinion concluded that even if DuPont knew it would gain a monopoly share,
such knowledge was not enough to turn legitimate business conduct into an
illegal practice
or to presume an intent to lessen competition or create a
96
monopoly.
Another current problem in U.S. antitrust law concerns shared monopolies. Justice Department officials 97 acknowledge that antitrust theorists differ
on the nature and extent of the problem, and whether it is structural 98 or
behavioral; 99 some theorists warn that enforcement agencies should distinguish between contrived and natural oligopolistic pricing;1 0 still others argue
that there is no problem at all.' The concern of the Antitrust Division is that
a few dominant firms in a market, aware of their oligopolistic interdependence, may also be able to coordinate their decision making so as to achieve a
monopolylike level of performance without an overt agreement.
The Antitrust Division has had underway for more than two years 0 a2
systematic examination of concentrated industries in the United States.
Several concerns have motivated the division to undertake this study. First,
concentration improves the firms' ability to coordinate behavior leading to
anticompetitive results. In order to circumvent the rigors of competition,
these firms must be able to reach some consensus as to the right noncompetitive price structure. In addition, they must be able to detect rivals who
might otherwise 10 succeed
in gaining increased profits by undercutting the
3
consensus price.
Concentration alone may not be enough to enable the firms to coordinate
their activities. These firms may have to adopt facilitating mechanisms,
which the Antitrust Division has defined as any practice (often developed
over time and perhaps even serving a legitimate business purpose) which
facilitates interdependent or cooperative behavior.' 4 Facilitating mechanisms
will vary within each industry. An illustration of the type of activity that may
be classified as a facilitating mechanism can be found in the WestinghouseGE consent decree entered with the United States in 1976.105 Westinghouse
and GE made available to each other current price and other competitive
information through price books containing simplified procedures for pricing
turbogenerators, along with a multiplier that could be used to determine the
price each would use in any given sales situation. Both also introduced price
protection policies designed to ensure treatment to all customers, but also
published outstanding orders and price quotations. As a result, both companies had a means to coordinate prices and avoid accidental or intentional
price undercutting.
Shared monopolies appear to be a matter of considerable concern outside
the United States as well. The Treaty of Rome establishing the European
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Economic Community contains a provision addressed to abuses of a dominant position by one or more enterprises. 0 6 A bill is pending before the
Canadian Parliament that would authorize civil review of joint monopolization, defined as any situation where a small number of firms account for
more than 50 percent of a relevant market and pursue closely parallel
policies.' °7 Japan recently enacted a law that presumes an industry to be
monopolized when the market share of one company exceeds 50 percent or
the combined share of two companies exceeds 75 percent. 08 In 1978, the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission announced that twenty-six lines of manufacturing industries were considered in a state of monopoly or shared
monopoly.' 9 At present, there is very little practical experience with these
laws, but interest in shared monopoly among various antitrust agencies ap110
pears to be increasing.
United States antitrust agencies are acquiring more extensive information about concentration through the recently enacted premerger notification
requirement of the Clayton Act."' These notification requirements extend to
certain foreign transactions, including those involving major foreign sellers
doing business in the United States or those with significant assets located
here."t 2 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (the Act) does not cover all acquisitions or
mergers that should be reviewed by antitrust authorities. Rather the Act
purposely limited the reporting requirements to the activities most likely to
raise antitrust concerns. Thus, obtaining information about trends in concentration as such, both here and abroad, will only be assisted partially by this
mandatory requirement. 3

THE TRANSNATIONAL

PART OF THE PROBLEM

If little agreement exists on the definition of the concentration problem, there
is even less on what assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are considered
appropriate to limit transnational concentration. That, in essence, is the
transnational part of the problem. The Justice Department's active enforcement of the antitrust laws in U.S. foreign commerce has met some resistance, especially from foreign governments. The most recent causes celbres
involved the so-called international uranium cartel and the North Atlantic
shipping case. 114 A corollary of the jurisdictional problem is that the difficulties of enforcing U.S. antitrust law over foreign enterprises, especially when
they do not operate in the United States, sometimes gives such enterprises a
type of antitrust immunity that domestic enterprises do not enjoy." 5 Largely
in response to the uranium and shipping cases, the British government has
recently adopted legislation that increases the powers of the British Secretary
of State to prevent compliance with foreign (read United States) demands for
evidence or other orders that offend British jurisdiction or sovereignty, limits
enforcement in Great Britain of foreign antitrust and multiple damage judgments, and (perhaps of most interest) enables British persons and companies
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to recover damages paid under
foreign judgments in excess of actual dam6
ages to the foreign plaintiff."
The problem, of course, is not new. Laws blocking foreign access to
evidence have been on the books in Great Britain and elsewhere for some
time," 7 and the Australian government recently prohibited the enforcement8
of foreign antitrust judgments that offend its jurisdiction and sovereignty. 11
Two suggestions seem in order. First, as State Department Legal Adviser
John Stevenson noted in 1970,
In the overwhelming majority of cases, where problems [of jurisdiction]
have arisen they have not been the result of invalid exercises of juris9
diction but rather of two valid, conflicting exercises of jurisdiction."
Antitrust cases have generally not been brought either by enforcement
agencies or private parties unless there was a substantial U.S. connection.
Second, the objection of foreign countries is often not to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law per se, but rather to its unilateral application.
Where international agreement exists, even the United Kingdom applies its
law extraterritorially.120 The contracting parties of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permit the application of each others' antidumping
and countervailing duty laws to conduct abroad and generally permit the
gathering of evidence by other countries in their territories in order to enforce these laws. 121
Unfortunately, the differences among nations (even our major trading
partners) regarding antitrust enforcement have made similar agreements in
the antitrust field impossible. The recently concluded 1979 OECD Council
Recommendation on Cooperation in Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade calls for member states to cooperate with foreign investigations where national laws and national interests permit.'22 Even this constructive step forward necessitates a sometimes painful case-by-case approach that is not always successful in resolving conflict.
The shipping and uranium cases illustrate these points. In the former,
heavy fines were assessed against a number of U.S. and foreign firms and
individuals for fixing rates and otherwise restraining competition among
them in the North Atlantic shipping trade. Since the case involved shipments
to and from U.S. ports there was little question that the U.S. government had
jurisdiction in a legal sense; U.S. antitrust authorities have the power, and
we believe the right, to set and enforce rules for the conduct of those who
wish to do business in the United States. However, the United States was not
the only country with both a direct interest in the activity and legitimate
jurisdiction to regulate it. Foreign governments argued, as they have persistently done in the past, that the United States should not unilaterally regulate this inherently international industry.
In the case of the so-called uranium cartel, certain foreign governments
in 1972 sponsored the establishment of an international arrangement for the
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setting of floor prices for uranium exported by their domestic producers. This
was in response to an embargo imposed by the United States against all
importation of uranium for U.S. domestic consumption, which eliminated
well over half the world's uranium market for foreign producers. There was
some evidence that the cartel had an indirect effect on uranium prices in the
U.S. domestic market, and that members of the cartel attempted to prevent
U.S. middleman uranium dealers from selling uranium abroad. The Department of Justice conducted an extensive grand jury investigation into the
activities of the cartel and brought a criminal prosecution against the Gulf Oil
Corporation." It did not, however, sue the foreign members of the cartel.
In both of these cases, foreign governments resisted all attempts by the
grand juries to obtain evidence in their countries. Nonetheless, substantial
evidence was obtained from documents located within the United States and
in the case of the uranium cartel, from inspection of documents obtained
from Australia by the environmental organization Friends of the Earth.
The Justice Department's decision in the uranium case not to take criminal action against the foreign defendants, over which it believed it had jurisdiction, was taken primarily because of considerations of comity' 24 that
weighed against the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign participants
in the cartel. 125 Among the factors leading to this conclusion were: (1) the
impact of the uranium cartel on United States commerce was not found to be
substantial, (2) the cartel was formed pursuant to clear and important policies of the involved foreign states, and (3) these policies sought the reasonable objective of preserving foreign uranium industries from the otherwise
devastating blow of the protectionist U.S. uranium import embargo. However, a different standard was applied to Gulf because its first obligation as a
U.S. corporation was to comply with the law of the United States and it could
be expected to be aware of and to act in conformity with that law.
Transnational mergers and joint ventures can raise similar problems. On
the whole, U.S. law enforcement in this area has been quite circumspect.
This is due in part to considerations of comity and to the fact that Section 7
of the Clayton Act applies only to mergers between firms that are actually
engaged in U.S. commerce. 26 However, several additional factors are involved when one or both parties to a merger are foreign companies. First,
differences in language and custom, and uncertainties connected with foreign trade and investment, constitute additional barriers to entry into the
U.S. market; foreign companies are thus less likely to be considered potential
competitors. This may have been a factor in the British Oxygen decision' 27 as
well as in a recent FTC decision not to oppose the acquisition by J. I. Case
Company, (a subsidiary of Tenneco) of the French firm Poclain. Case proposed to acquire a 40 percent interest in Poclain assuring control of its U.S.
assets (including a U.S. subsidiary). The Poclain group of companies is Europe's largest manufacturer of heavy construction equipment. However, the
firm was in some financial difficulty.12 Both Case and Poclain produced
hydraulic excavators and cranes, though Poclain had not produced or sold
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these products in the United States. The French government had approved
the acquisition, presumably to increase the economic vitality of an important
French manufacturing entity.
Considerations of comity, the importance of the merger to the French
economy, as well as the improbability that a foreign company in financial
difficulty would enter the U.S. market, may have led to the FTC's decision to
permit the merger.
In another instance, the Justice Department objected to a proposed international joint venture, despite the significant adverse impact its decision
had on the interests of two foreign governments. Pratt & Whitney of Canada
and Rolls Royce of Britain proposed a joint venture whose purpose was to
29
produce an executive jet engine largely for sale in the United States. 1 Pratt
Technolo& Whitney of Canada was a wholly owned subsidiary of United
gies, a U.S. firm. The Justice Department found that United Technologies
and Rolls Royce were the two largest manufacturers of jet engines in the
non-Communist world, and the world market was very concentrated. The
Justice Department reasoned that these two companies could each produce
the engines and that the joint venture would preclude potential competition
between them. It rejected the argument that the venture was so costly that
independent development was unlikely. It also rejected the argument that
there already were several viable competitors in the market who would remain unaffected by the joint venture. While this was true, the combination of
the Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney names was likely to overwhelm the less
well-known competitors.
This decision led to abandonment of the venture, thereby frustrating a
significant investment in Canada that would have been welcomed by the
Canadian government. One could argue that the United States should have
ignored this joint venture, since Pratt & Whitney Canada was not a U.S.
company. But it was wholly owned and controlled by United Technologies;
there was every reason to treat them as one entity. This economic unit
notion, though objected to by many foreign governments, is not exclusively
American.' 3 ' Furthermore, the original joint venture proposal brought to the
department involved a Pratt & Whitney plant in the United States. It appears
that the Canadian plant was suggested as a new location for manufacturing
after the U.S. situs joint venture was rejected. It should be pointed out that
while the Justice Department opposed this joint venture it approved a more
speculative and costly collaboration between Rolls Royce and United Technologies to produce a different size jet turbofan engine.
Second, U.S. antitrust enforcement against foreign enterprises is also
somewhat limited by the difficulties in obtaining evidence abroad. The British bill 3 ' is a reminder that foreign governments can and do block U.S.
enforcement efforts. In many merger and joint venture cases, the involvement of one U.S. firm will be a sufficient avenue to challenge the transac32
tion; this is especially true since the Premerger Notification Law' gives U.S.
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agencies the chance to investigate and obtain information concerning proposed mergers and joint ventures. Further, the Justice Department33now has
the power to issue Civil Investigative Demands to persons abroad. 1
When a U.S. agency or court serves compulsory process on a foreign
party, and that party, acting in good faith, is prohibited by local law from
complying with it, one nation's interests must give way. U.S. courts have so far
held that the relative interests must be weighed and that, where the foreign
national interest is strong, and the consequences for the private party under
the foreign law for compliance are severe, they will often not require compliance. 3 3 This problem further differentiates the application of U.S. antitrust
laws between U.S. and foreign firms operating in transnational commerce.
Finally, there is sometimes a problem in formulating an appropriate
remedy in international merger cases. If a U.S. firm proposes to merge with a
foreign firm or enter into a joint venture with it, this can be easily enjoined.
However, if two foreign firms with no U.S. affiliates combine, there may be
no practical way to attack the transaction, even if one or both parties have
substantial sales in the United States. Suppose, on the other hand, that both
these foreign firms have U.S. subsidiaries that have a relatively small share
of the U.S. market that is, however, subject to scrutiny under the Justice
Department's Merger Guidelines. Should the United States and other countries in similar positions require divestiture of the U.S. subsidiaries? Again, a
weighing of the relative interests in the transaction may hold the only principled solution.
Because of all these factors-comity, jurisdiction, additional barriers to
entry, evidence, and remedies-U.S. antitrust laws concerning economic concentration affect domestic firms more than foreign firms. Whether this places
U.S. companies at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign competitors here or
abroad is beyond the scope of this brief discussion. It should be remembered,
however, that U.S. companies are generally free to conduct joint operations in
foreign markets and to merge with foreign firms if in the process they do not
restrain or tend to suppress competition in the United States.
The clearer problem is that these factors substantially increase the uncertainties of antitrust analysis, a problem aggravated by the fact that decision making is not centralized. Antitrust enforcement involves not only the
Department of Justice and the FTC, but also the courts and sometimes other
agencies. Moreover, private suits may be filed regardless of whether the
government takes any action. In both the uranium and shipping cases, massive treble damage actions are underway' 35 and, in the shipping case, the
Federal Maritime Commission is investigating whether the alleged arrangements violated the Shipping Act of 1916. 136
It has been argued that antitrust enforcement in foreign commerce
should be treated as an element of U.S. foreign economic policy and should
be handled by diplomacy rather than by legal process.'37 This would work a
substantial modification, both procedural and substantive, of the antitrust
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laws as they apply to foreign commerce. It is, quite frankly, unlikely to occur.
However, it may be that, at a minimum, the federal government should take
a more active role in private litigation. In certain cases, it may be appropriate
for the government to provide its views to the courts on questions of jurisdiction and comity through amicus curiae briefs. This could promote a more
consistent U.S. approach in an area of great concern to our allies and to the
United Staes. To date, the federal government has hesitated even to appear
to take sides in private suits; however, some cases may have such international economic and political significance that they should become the legitimate concern of the executive branch.

CONCLUSION

While we have tried to demonstrate that the lack of consensus within the
United States, and among other nations, on what is and is not the concentration problem is a fundamental impediment to the establishment of transnational standards or institutions for addressing it, there is still a basis for
present collaboration leading to possible future consensus. At the least, increasing horizontal and aggregate concentration leads to new economic relationships and dependencies that may in some respects be both less efficient
and more harmful to important social and political values. Accordingly, these
phenomena should be better measured and understood.
The OECD report' 38 may be a watershed document. If it is possible to
agree that obtaining a better understanding of the nature and impact of
industrial concentration is a shared problem for developed countries, then a
necessary basis for further international collaboration will be established.
Five developing stages of international collaboration are possible. The
first stage is expanding the collection and reporting of concentration data
within the various nation states. The OECD report recognizes this objective
as essential to further action. It suggests that:
(a) Concentration statistics should be expanded by, for example, calculating several different measures, and by introducing new size variables, studying enterprise and local concentration, defining industries more finely, taking into account foreign trade, and by studying
concentration outside the industrial sector;...
(c) studies should be undertaken into the relationships between the
structure of an industry and its behavior and performance; and
(d) where Member countries have not produced concentration studies,
they should either undertake such studies themselves or encourage
private research into the causes and effects of concentration .... 139
The second stage is sharing, comparing, and analyzing data across national boundaries. If the Japanese experience is relevant to U.S. law enforce-
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ment and vice versa, more uniform data and data gathering is necessary, as
are institutions to collect and disseminate this information, such as the
OECD, GATT, UNCTAD and the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, as well as private research bodies. There is a clear and disconcerting
absence of relevant comparative data and important analytical studies of
industrial organization.14 Furthermore, only recently have U.S. antitrust enforcers (and even more recently, a handful of private U.S. antitrust lawyers)
agreed that something can be learned from foreign antitrust experience.
Foreign data should be utilized in more U.S. analysis and foreign legal developments should be referred to more frequently in developing U.S. enforcement policy and common law jurisprudence.
The third stage is compiling information on and reflecting upon industrial concentration in international markets. Progress in the first two developmental stages will facilitate this process. Such action may assist U.S.
antitrust authorities in determining appropriate enforcement policy as to
concentration in the U.S. submarkets of larger world markets, such as the
automobile industry. The OECD Steel Committee, acting independently of
the work of the Restrictive Business Practices Committee, is accumulating
and analyzing such aggregate data to assist member states in coping with
the international economic difficulties of that industry. "4' The International
42
Energy Agency is performing a similar task as to the world oil industry.1
Further progress at this stage requires greater willingness to share data
across national boundaries and to accommodate the conflicting goals of
promoting knowledge and progress on the one hand, while providing some
protection to national security and private proprietary interests on the other.
The fourth stage is greater cooperation between nation states in facilitating the investigations and prosecutions of national enforcement agencies
against transnational enterprises acting outside that nation's territory with a
significant adverse impact within its territory. It is becoming increasingly
clear that extraterritorial law enforcement is an inevitable and increasing fact
of life in an interdependent world. Absent any extraterritorial enforcement,
transnational enterprises possess the theoretical ability to at least partially
evade the enforcement of laws of a nation affected by their conduct.
The main problem with extraterritorial antitrust enforcement is not so
much that it is extraterritorial, but that it involves direct conflicts between
sovereign jurisdictions over fundamental policies. If greater consensus does
develop that there is a phenomenon of excessive concentration, it may be
desirable for one nation to defer to the law enforcement efforts of another in
particular instances for the purposes of gathering information across boundaries or asserting jurisdiction over one's nationals. This type of cooperation is
increasing not only with respect to organized crime and drug smuggling, but43
also with respect to unfair trade practices as defined in the GATT codes. 1
While cooperation on international cartel activity would be expected to come
sooner, this stage becomes plausible when the other three have been well
established.
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Finally, progress to that extent would make it possible to consider a joint
enforcement effort by teams of enforcers from two or more national antitrust
agencies, or even by employees of an international antitrust agency dealing
with excessive concentration by transnational enterprises in several national
markets. For those who consider this a utopian vision, consider what the
Competition Directorate of the EEC has accomplished in just fifteen years. It
has fleshed out a multilateral treaty into an organic body of developing case
law-with strong common standards and multinational enforcement experience. 144 Twenty-five years ago, few scholars would have expected such
progress for a joint antitrust agency working to promote competition among
such a diversity of European states, inter alia, by increasing collaboration
with national antitrust agencies.
The work of a distinguished political scientist, Inis Claude, suggests that
this proposed agenda follows a fifty-year-old theory in international relations
called functionalism.4 Most fully developed by David Mitrany,146 its cornerstone is the proposition that "a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of
political conflicts" is the development of ad hoc institutions of economic and
social cooperation.1 47 The Mitrany thesis should be acceptable to antitrust
authorities who are skeptical about comprehensive planning for social and
economic organizations. It is not yet possible to define clearly and commonly
the concentration problem, let alone fashion a viable remedy for it; however,
government officials can at least commit themselves to learn and share.
This volume may be an important early step on the road to cooperatively
solving the problem, for it provides a basis in Mitrany's words for ".... binding together those interests which are common, where they are common and
to the extent to which they are common. '"148
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ANNEX 1: REMARKS ON THE OECD CONCENTRATION REPORT

Remarks on the OECD report "Concentration and Competition Policy", by
Mr. D. G. Gill, member of the group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD,
made to the members of the Bureau of the OECD Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices at a meeting held on June 27, 1979. See Summary Record of the 36th meeting of the Committee, OECD Doc. No. RBP/
M(79)1 at item XI.
OECD Report on Concentrationand Competition Policy
I recently received the draft of chapter 4 dated 19 April. I have not had an
opportunity to read the other sections of the OECD's study on concentration
and competition policy and will confine most of my comments to those portions of the report dealing with the U.S.
I should note initially that, while the chapter contains a number of
comments with which I disagree, overall I found much in the report with
which I would agree. Paras. 4 and 5 discuss the many technical problems
involved in measuring concentration, and I certainly agree with and endorse
the description of the many great difficulities involved in this exercise. The
problem, at least in the U.S., is that the data derives from different bases, is
non-comparable over time, and includes non-comparable numerators and
denominators. Usually, the data is contaminated: for example, foreign operations may or may not be included in numerators or denominators, and much
non-manufacturing data is always included for manufacturing companies.
The definitions of industries are extremely artificial. Many of my criticisms of
the report stem from precisely these inadequacies. I note the following:
(1) Para. 11 observes that in the U.S. from 1958 to 1972 "concentration
tended to remain stable in already highly concentrated industries but increased in the low to medium concentrated industries in a sample of 183
comparable manufacturing industries for which data were available". Many
economists and university professors in the U.S. question whether any such
trend is really observable. Betty Bock, Yale Brozen, Harold Demsets and Fred
Weston are representative of the many economists in the U.S. who challenge
the interpretations of concentration figures issued by the U.S. Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
(2) Para. 15 states that overall concentration in the U.S. in manufacturing increased significantly in the post-war period from 1947 to 1952. The
report goes on to say that "most of this increase appears to have occurred in
the early part of the period". In fact, when one looks at the data, the latter
sentence is a clear understatement. The data (and I here refer to The Conference Board's 1978 study, p. 3, of The Relativity of Concentration Observations) show that the hundred largest U.S. firms grew not at all in their share
of total value added by manufacturing during the period from 1963 to 1972.
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The OECD report goes on to say that the percentage of total manufacturing
assets held by the Fortune 500 largest industrial corporations rose from 73 to
83% from 1972 to 1977. In fact, the official statistics of the U.S., contained in
the 1978 Statistical Abstract, at p. 576, show that the share of the 200 largest
firms (no data is furnished for the 500 largest corporations) declined from
60% in 1972 to 58.4% in 1977. As my economist friends say, it is very
difficult to observe much of a trend here.
(3) Para. 29 of the OECD report says that in the U.S. a considerable
amount of research confirms Bain's finding of a positive correlation between
concentration and profitability. I am sure that you are all aware that a considerable amount of research does not confirm Bain's "finding"; indeed, more
recent and complete economic studies flatly reject it. I will here cite only
Messrs. Brozen, Singer, Stigler and McGee. These and other academics have
severely criticized the smallness and the lack of comparability of Professor
Bain's sample. Indeed, when one examines the definition of "price-cost margin", one finds that it includes all sorts of things: taxes, overhead, depreciation, distribution expense, research and development, everything other than
costs of materials and payrolls. Again, concentration statistics tend to be
extremely artificial in both their components and interpretations.
(4) Para. 31 says that it is "apparent" that high concentration is increasing in the recent past. Most of the economists whom I have quoted would
reject any such simplistic conclusion for the U.S. I call your attention to an
interesting article on Aggregate Concentration, published last month by
Betty Bock, Jack Farkas, Deborah Weinberger of The Conference Board. The
Conference Board makes the obvious points about the inadequacies of the
statistics, the non-comparability of numerators and denominators and the
artificiality of the industry classifications. They also point out that the identity
of the 50 or 100 or 200 largest manufacturing corporations changes from
year to year. For example, between 1947 and 1977, 21 of the 50 largest in
assets in 1947 had been replaced by other corporations by 1977. Eighty-five
of the 200 largest in sales had been replaced by 1977. The pattern is similar
for sales and assets for whatever group you chose to examine. Is it reasonable
then to talk about the common characteristics of the 50, 100 or 200 largest
corporations over a period of time when the identity of the group is changing? The Conference Board concludes by suggesting that "far from witnessing signals of agglomeration of corporate power in fewer and fewer handswe are seeing data showing an apparent explosion above the standard cutoffs. And we are witnessing this proliferation without significant support
from conglomeration or large-scale acquisition. Are we, then, viewing numbers that show increasing power in a few hands-or signals of a dispersion of
size at the top?
(5) Para. 43 states that studies in the U.S. "have concluded" that
mergers account for a varying but significant proportion of increases in concentration. In fact, for the 200 largest corporations the annualized ratio of
acquisitions as a percentage of change in assets varied from .60 of 1% in
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1947-54 to 1.04% in the 1972-1977 period. The figures for all manufacturing corporations were somewhat lower but roughly equivalent in all periods.
Para. 43 goes on to observe that conglomerate mergers have been increasingly in evidence as a percentage of merger activity in the U.S., a far from
surprising phenomenon when one considers the enthusiastic and effective
enforcement of the U.S. antimerger statute against horizontal and vertical
acquisitions. Finally, the report goes on to suggest that the profits of the
leading firms in concentrated industries tend to be higher than required to
attract capital. The generality of this last observation almost defies analysis
and, insofar as it is based upon price-cost margin figures, is virtually without
meaning. As Betty Bock has observed, "until we have profit and concentration data that match, mechanical mating of the two types of information can
produce only hybrid conclusions."
(6) In conclusion, let me make three points:
(a) The report observes that "in the absence of conclusive evidence on concentration and its effect", we should all take note
of the politically important point concerning the danger of centralization of power in the hands of a few enterprises. Fair
enough-but perhaps equally relevant is the danger of the
centralization of economic power in the hands of government
and government ministries who regulate economic enterprises
on the basis of hopelessly inexact economic data or interpretations thereof. Misleading or poorly interpreted data can provide
a convenient excuse to those regulators who wish to substitute
their personal social or political judgments in place of the economic judgment of the market.
(b) One is also struck, in reading the report, at the lack of reference to international economic competition. Para. 3 mentions
the relevance of such competition but then focuses on the
various domestic markets which obviously have higher concentration ratios. In the U.S. context, for example, discussion
of domestic automobile industry concentration ratios without
reference to increasing international competition makes no
economic sense at all.
(c) In remarks last year at an antitrust seminar, Ms. Betty Bock
cited an illustration to demonstrate her contention that economic theories based solely on structure and so-called objective economic statistics can be extremely dangerous. Some
years ago the U.S. antitrust authorities, noting that the two top
U.S. tire companies accounted for a high percentage of all
tires manufactured in the U.S. and had previously lowered
their prices for premium tires to the disadvantage of small
competitors, brought a suit against the two companies, essentially claiming that they were behaving in a monopolistic fashion. After careful examination, the Antitrust Division, conced-

Doctrines and Problems of U.S. Control - 41
ing that it had failed to consider a number of very important
factors in bringing suit, asked for the dismissal of the suit.
These factors included such facts as the shift of tire buyers
away from premium to regular brands and the presence in the
tire market of the huge automobile companies which were the
principal customers for tires. The presence of this countervailing customer power effectively regulated the tire manufacturers. The point I am making is that statistics and concentration figures alone are no substitute for adequate economic
analyses.

